e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第44部分
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is is not an industry in which it is easy to forecast future levels of profitability。 We continue to believe that our conversion privilege could well have important value over the life of our preferred。 However； the overwhelming portion of the preferred value resides in its fixed…ine characteristics； not its equity characteristics。
我们与所罗门CEO… John Gutfreund之间良好的关系，随着几年来的合作日益增进，但我们还是无法判断投资银行业的前景，不管是短期、中期或是长期皆然，这是一个难以预估未来获利程度的产业，我们仍然相信我们所拥有的转换权利会在其有效期间内，对我们产生相当大的贡献，然而这种特别股的价值主要还是来自于其固定收益，而不是股权特性之上。
We have not lost our aversion to long…term bonds。 We will bee enthused about such securities only when we bee enthused about prospects for long…term stability in the purchasing power of money。 And that kind of stability isn in the cards： Both society and elected officials simply have too many higher…ranking priorities that conflict with purchasing…power stability。 The only long…term bonds we hold are those of Washington Public Power Supply Systems （WPPSS）。 A few of our WPPSS bonds have short maturities and many others； because of their high coupons； are likely to be refunded and paid off in a few years。 Overall； our WPPSS holdings are carried on our balance sheet at 247 million and have a market value of about 352 million。
我们对于长期债券的规避依旧不变，唯有当我们对于货币的长期购买力有信心时，我们才会对这类的债券有兴趣，但这种稳定却根本没办法预期，因为不管是社会或是选出来的官员实在是有太多的优先事项是与购买力的稳定性相冲突的。所以目前我们唯一持有的长期债券就是WPPSS华盛顿功用电力供应系统，其中有些属于短期，有一些则是分几年赎回的高票息，目前资产负债表上帐列成本为2。47亿美元，目前市价约为3。52亿美元。
We explained the reasons for our WPPSS purchases in the 1983 annual report； and are pleased to tell you that this mitment has worked out about as expected。 At the time of purchase； most of our bonds were yielding around 17％ after taxes and carried no ratings； which had been suspended。 Recently； the bonds were rated AA… by Standard & Poor。 They now sell at levels only slightly below those enjoyed by top…grade credits。
我们在1983年年报中曾经解释过购买WPPSS的理由，现在很高兴跟大家报告结果完全符合我们当初的预期，在买进的时候，债券的评等被暂时取消，估计税后的投资报酬率约为17％，最近它被史坦普评等机构评为AA…等级，目前的市价大概只有比最高等级债信的投资报酬好一点。
In the 1983 report； we pared the economics of our WPPSS purchase to those involved in buying a business。 As it turned out； this purchase actually worked out better than did the general run of business acquisitions made in 1983； assuming both are measured on the basis of unleveraged； after tax returns achieved through 1988。
在1983年的年报中，我们比较了投资WPPSS与一般企业的差异，结果显示这次的投资要比当时同期间所从事购并案还要好，假设两者皆以为无财务杠杆的基础下进行。
Our WPPSS experience； though pleasant； does nothing to alter our negative opinion about long…term bonds。 It only makes us hope that we run into some other large stigmatized issue； whose troubles have caused it to be significantly misappraised by the market。
不过我们在WPPSS的愉快经验并未能改变我们对于长期债券的负面看法，除非再让我们碰到暂时僵住的大案子，因为短暂的问题使得其市价严重的被低估。
Arbitrage
套利
In past reports we have told you that our insurance subsidiaries sometimes engage in arbitrage as an alternative to holding short…term cash equivalents。 We prefer； of course； to make major long…term mitments； but we often have more cash than good ideas。 At such times； arbitrage sometimes promises much greater returns than Treasury Bills and； equally important； cools any temptation we may have to relax our standards for long…term investments。 （Charlie sign off after wee talked about an arbitrage mitment is usually： kay； at least it will keep you out of bars。？
在过去的报告中我曾经告诉各位保险子公司有时也会从事套利的操作，以作为短期资金的替代，当然我们比较喜欢长期的投入，但可惜资金总是多过于点子，与此同时，套利的报酬有时会多过于政府公债，同时很重要的一点是可以稍微缓和我们对于寻找长期资金去处的压力，（每次在我们谈完套利投资之后，查理总是会附带一句，这样也好，至少能让你暂时远离市场）
During 1988 we made unusually large profits from arbitrage； measured both by absolute dollars and rate of return。 Our pre…tax gain was about 78 million on average invested funds of about 147 million。
在1988年我们在套利部份斩获不少，不论是金额或是投资报酬率，总计投入1。47亿美元的资金，赚取7；800万美元的获利。
This level of activity makes some detailed discussion of arbitrage and our approach to it appropriate。 Once； the word applied only to the simultaneous purchase and sale of securities or foreign exchange in two different markets。 The goal was to exploit tiny price differentials that might exist between； say； Royal Dutch stock trading in guilders in Amsterdam； pounds in London； and dollars in New York。 Some people might call this scalping； it won surprise you that practitioners opted for the French term； arbitrage。
如此的成绩使我们值得详细的描述一下，所谓的套利是指在不同的市场同时买卖相同的有价证券或是外汇，目的是为了撷取两者之间微小的差距，例如阿姆斯特丹的荷兰币、英国的英镑或是纽约的美元，有些人将此行为称之为剃头皮，但通常这一行的人惯用法国的字汇…套利。
Since World War I the definition of arbitrage … or isk arbitrage；？as it is now sometimes called … has expanded to include the pursuit of profits from an announced corporate event such as sale of the pany； merger； recapitalization； reorganization； liquidation； self…tender； etc。 In most cases the arbitrageur expects to profit regardless of the behavior of the stock market。 The major risk he usually faces instead is that the announced event won happen。
自从第一次世界大战之后，套利或者说风险套利的定义，已延伸包括从已公开的企业购并、重整再造、清算等企业活动中获利，大部分的情况下，套利者期望不管股市变动如何皆能获利，相对的他面临的主要风险是宣布的事件未如预期般发生。
Some offbeat opportunities occasionally arise in the arbitrage field。 I participated in one of these when I was 24 and working in New York for Graham…Newman Corp。 Rockwood & Co。； a Brooklyn based chocolate products pany of limited profitability； had adopted LIFO inventory valuation in 1941 when cocoa was selling for 50 cents per pound。 In 1954 a temporary shortage of cocoa caused the price to soar to over 60 cents。 Consequently Rockwood wished to unload its valuable inventory … quickly； before the price dropped。 But if the cocoa had simply been sold off； the pany would have owed close to a 50％ tax on the proceeds。
有些特别的套利机会也会偶尔出现，我记得在24岁时当时我在纽约的葛拉罕…纽曼公司上班，Rockwood一家在布鲁克林生产巧克力的公司，原则该公司自1941年开始就采用后进先出制的存货评价方式，那时可可亚每磅是50美分，到了1954年可可亚因为暂时缺货价格大涨至64美分，因此Rockwood想要把帐上价值不菲的可可亚存货在价格滑落之前变卖掉，但若是直接将这批货卖掉，所得的收益可能要支付50％左右的税金，但1954的税务法令及时公布，其中有一项不太为人知的规定，就是如果企业不是把这些存货卖掉而是直接分配给股东间接减少营运规模的话，就可以免税，因此Rockwood决定停止其贩卖可可亚奶油的业务，并将1；300万磅的可可亚豆子发还给股东，同时公司也愿意以可可亚豆子换买回部份股份，换算下来，每股可以换得80磅的豆子。
The 1954 Tax Code came to the rescue。 It contained an arcane provision that eliminated the tax otherwise due on LIFO profits if inventory was distributed to shareholders as part of a plan reducing the scope of a corporation business。 Rockwood decided to terminate one of its businesses； the sale of cocoa butter； and said 13 million pounds of its cocoa bean inventory was attributable to that activity。 Accordingly； the pany offered to repurchase its stock in exchange for the cocoa beans it no longer needed； paying 80 pounds of beans for each share。 For several weeks I busily bought shares； sold beans； and made periodic stops at Schroeder Trust to exchange stock certificates for warehouse receipts。 The profits were good and my only expense was subway tokens。
有好几个礼拜我整天忙着买进股票、换豆子，再把豆子拿去卖，并常常跑到Schroeder信托公司拿着股票凭证换取仓库保管单，获利算下来还不错，而唯一的成本费用就是地铁车票。
The architect of Rockwood restructuring was an unknown； but brilliant Chicagoan； Jay Pritzker； then 32。 If youe familiar with Jay subsequent record； you won be surprised to hear the action worked out rather well for Rockwood continuing shareholders also。 From shortly before the tender until shortly after it； Rockwood stock appreciated from 15 to 100； even though the pany was experiencing large operating losses。 Sometimes there is more to stock valuation than price…earnings ratios。
Rockwood改造计画的规划者是32岁没有名气但相当优秀的芝加哥人Jay Pritzker，若你知道Jay后来的记录，你应该就不会讶异这个动作对于公司股东有多大的益处了，在这项提议推出不久之后，虽然公司营运呈现亏损，但Rockwood的股价却从15美元涨到100美元，有时股票的价格会远远超过合理的本益比之外。
In recent years； most arbitrage operations have involved takeovers； friendly and unfriendly。 With acquisition fever rampant； with anti…trust challenges almost non…existent； and with bids often ratcheting upward； arbitrageurs have prospered mightily。 They have not needed special talents to do well； the trick； a la Peter Sellers in the movie； has simpl
